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ON THE QUESTION OF 
VALUE' 
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK 
One of the determinations of the question of value is the predication of the 
subject. The modern "idealist" predication of the subject is consciousness. 
Labor-power is a "materialist" predication. Consciousness is not thought, but 
rather the subject's irreducible intendedness towards the object. Correspond- 
ingly, labor-power is not work (labor), but rather the irreducible possibility that 
the subject be more than adequate - super-adequate- to itself, labor-power: "it 
distinguishes itself [unterscheidet sich] from the ordinary crowd of commodities 
in that its use creates value, and a greater value than it costs itself" [Karl Marx, 
Capital, Vol. 1, 342; translation modified]. 
The "idealist" and the "materialist" are both exclusive predications. There 
have been attempts to question this exclusivist opposition, generally by way of a 
critique of the "idealist" predication of the subject: Nietzsche and Freud are the 
most spectacular European examples. Sometimes consciousness is analogized 
with labor-power as in the debates over intellectual and manual labor. 
Althusser's notion of "theoretical production" is the most controversial instance 
[For Marx 173-93]. The anti-Oedipal argument in France seems to assume a cer- 
tain body without predication or without predication-function. (The celebrated 
"body without organs" is one product of this assumption -see Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.) I have not yet 
been able to read this as anything but a last-ditch metaphysical longing. Since I 
remain bound by the conviction that subject-predication is methodologically 
necessary, I will not comment upon this anti-Oedipal gesture. The better part of 
my essay will concern itself with what the question of value becomes when 
determined by a "materialist" subject-predication such as Marx's.2 This is a theo- 
retical enterprise requiring a certain level of generality whose particular political 
implications I have tabulated in passing and in conclusion. Here it is in my in- 
terest to treat the theory-politics opposition as if intact. 
I am deeply grateful to Professor John Fekete for a thorough criticism of this piece. 
2Any serious consideration of this question must take into account Georg Simmel's 
monumental Philosophy of Money (trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). My differences with Simmel are considerable. He writes 
in a brilliantly analogical vein that cannot acknowledge the discontinuity between 
"idealist" and "materialist" predications. Although he is technically aware of the argument 
from surplus-value, he is basically interested in value-in-exchange. His anti-socialism is thus 
directed against a pre-Marxian socialism. His few references to Marx, as the translators note 
in their admirable introduction, do not betray knowledge of the Marxian text. Yet I have 
also been deeply influenced by his meditations upon the relationship between money and 
individualism and upon the beginnings of what Volosinov later called "behavioral 
ideology"; in a certain way even by his cogitation upon woman as commodity. In these 
respects, he should be distinguished from both the Engels of the Origin of the Family and 
the Weber of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
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Before I embark on the generalized project, I will set forth a practical deconstructivist- 
feminist-Marxist position on the question of value in a narrow disciplinary context. The issue 
of value surfaces in literary criticism with reference to canon-formation. From this narrowed 
perspective, the first move is a counter-question: why a canon? What is the ethico-political 
agenda that operates a canon? By way of a critique of phallogocentrism, the deconstructive 
impulse attempts to decenter the desire for the canon. Charting the agenda of phallocen- 
trism involves the feminist, that of logocentrism the Marxist interested in patterns of domina- 
tion. Yet for a deconstructive critic it is a truism that a full undoing of the canon-apocrypha 
opposition, like the undoing of any opposition, is impossible. ("The impossibility of a full un- 
doing" is the curious definitive predication of deconstruction.) When we feminist Marxists 
are ourselves moved by a desire for alternative canon-formations, we work with varieties of 
and variations upon the old standards. Here the critic's obligation seems to be a scrupulous 
declaration of "interest." 
We cannot avoid a kind of historico-political standard that the "disinterested" academy 
dismisses as "pathos." That standard emerges, mired in overdeterminations, in answer to the 
kinds of counter-questions of which the following is an example: What subject-effects were 
systematically effaced and trained to efface themselves so that a canonic norm might 
emerge? Since, considered from this perspective, literary canon-formation is seen to work 
within a much broader network of successful epistemic violence, questions of this kind are 
asked not only by feminist and Marxist critics, but also by anti-imperialist deconstructivists. 
Such counter-questions and declarations are often seen as constituting the new Marxist 
(feminist-deconstructivist) point of view on literary value. Since I share the point of view they 
subtend, I place them on the threshold of my essay as I move into my more generalized 
(more abstract?) concerns. 
The first distinction to make, then, is that the point of view above focuses on domina- 
tion. Concentrating on the desire for the canon, on the complicity with old standards, and 
on epistemic violence, the practical perspective of the discipline in the narrow sense need 
do no more than persistently clean up (or muddy) the "idealist" field as it nourishes the ques- 
tion of value. Any consideration of the question of value in its "materialist" predication must, 
however, examine Marx's investigation of exploitation. 
On the level of intellectual-historical gossip, the story of Marx's investigation of exploita- 
tion is well-known. Around 1857, Marx set out to unpack the concept-phenomenon money 
in response to the analyses and crisis-managerial suggestions of Fr6deric Bastiat and Henry 
Charles Carey, and to the utopian socialist projects endorsed by Proudhon. It is our task to 
suggest that, by lifting the lid of that seemingly unified concept-phenomenon, Marx un- 
covered the economic text. Some times it seems that cooking is a better figure than weaving 
when one speaks of the text, although the latter has etymological sanction. Lifting the lid, 
Marx discovers that the pot of the economic is forever on the boil. What cooks (in all senses 
of this enigmatic expression) is Value. It is our task also to suggest that, however avant-gardist 
it may sound, in this uncovering Value is seen to escape the onto-phenomenological ques- 
tion. It is also our task to emphasize that this is not merely asking ourselves to attend once 
again to the embarrassment of the final economic determinant but that, if the subject has a 
"materialist" predication, the question of value necessarily receives a textualized answer.3 
Let us first deal with the continuist version of Marx's scheme of value.4 Here is a crude 
31 am obliged here to admit that the "answer" that follows in this essay can in no way be considered 
definitive. This is my third attempt at working over these questions. The first, "Marx after Derrida," is to be 
found in William E. Cain, ed., Philosophical Approaches to Literature: New Essays on Nineteenth- and 
Twentieth-Century Texts (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1984). The second, an extended version 
of "the same piece," is forthcoming in Derek Attridge, et al., eds., Post-Structuralism and the Question of 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
41f we think of Marx, Freud, Nietzsche (Derrida includes Heidegger) as the crucial Western thinkers of 
discontinuity, betrayed or obliged by their method to unbridgeable gaps and shifts in planes, a 
deconstructivist reading shows their texts to be a battleground between the intimations of discontinuity 
and the strong pull toward constructing a continuous argument with a secure beginning (arch6), middle 
(historical enjambement), and end (telos). By and large, scholarship attempts to establish the continuity 
of the argument. It is therefore the continuist versions that are generally offered as the real Marx, the real 
Freud, the real Nietzsche. 
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summary: use-value is in play when a human being produces and uses up the product (or 
uses up the unproduced) immediately. Exchange-value emerges when one thing is 
substituted for another. Before the emergence of the money-form, exchange-value is ad hoc. 
Surplus-value is created when some value is produced for nothing. Yet even in this continuist 
version value seems to escape the onto-phenomenological question: what is it (ti esti). The 
usual answer- value is the representation of objectified labor- begs the question of use- 
value. 
This continuist version is not absent in Marx, and certainly not absent in Engels. The in- 
timations of discontinuity are most noticeably covered over in the move from the seven 
notebooks now collectively called the Grundrisse to the finished Capital I. It is a secondary 
revision of this version that yields the standard of measurement, indeed the calculus that 
emerges in the move from Capital I to Capital Ill. Vestiges of the "primary" continuist version 
linger in Derrida, whose version clearly animates Jean-Joseph Goux's Numismatiques, where 
most of the supporting evidence is taken from Capital I. Goux's reading, squaring the labor 
theory of value with the theories of ego-formation and signification in Freud and the early 
Lacan, is a rather special case of analogizing between consciousness and labor-power. Since 
my reading might seem superficially to resemble his, I will point at the unexamined presence 
of continuism in Goux in the next few paragraphs. 
Goux's study seems ostensibly to issue from the French school of thought that respects 
discontinuities. Derrida gave Numismatiques his endorsement in "White Mythology," itself 
an important essay in the argument for discontinuity (see Margins of Philosophy 215 and 
passim). Goux takes the continuist version of the value-schema outlined above as given in 
Marx, though of course he elaborates upon it somewhat. Within that general continuist 
framework, then, Goux concentrates upon a unilinear version of the development of the 
money-form and draws an exact isomorphic analogy (he insists upon this) between it and the 
Freudian account of the emergence of genital sexuality. He concentrates next on Marx's 
perception that the commodity which becomes the universal equivalent must be excluded 
from the commodity function for that very reason. Here the analogy, again, resolutely 
isomorphic, is with Lacan's account of the emergence of the phallus as transcendental 
signifier. (For an early succinct account see Jacques Lacan, "The Signification of the Phallus.") 
Here is the claim: "It is the same genetic process, it is the same principle of discontinuous and 
progressive structuration which commands the accession to normative sovereignty of gold, 
the father and the phallus. The phallus is the universal equivalent of subjects; just as gold is 
the universal equivalent of products" [Goux 77; translation mine]. Goux's establishment of a 
relationship between Marx and Lacan in terms of gold and the phallus is based on his 
reading of exchange as mirroring and thus a reading of the origin of Value in the Lacanian 
"mirror-phase." Goux does notice that exchange value arises out of superfluity, but the ques- 
tion of use-value he leaves aside, perhaps even as an embarrassment. 
Goux's argument is ingenious, but in the long run it seems to be an exercise in the 
domestication of Marx's analysis of Value. No doubt there are general morphological 
similarities between centralized sign-formations. But in order to see in those similarities the 
structural essence of the formations thus analogized, it is necessary to exclude the fields of 
force that make them heterogeneous, indeed discontinuous. It is to forget that Marx's cri- 
tique of money is functionally different from Freud's attitude toward genitalism or Lacan's 
toward the phallus. It is to exclude those relationships between the ego/phallus and money 
that are attributive and supportive and not analogical. (Inheritance in the male line by way of 
patronymic legitimacy, indirectly sustaining the complex lines of class-formation, is, for ex- 
ample, an area where the case of the money-form, and that of the ego-form in the dialectic 
of the phallus, support each other and lend the subject the attributes of class- and gender- 
identity.) It is also to overlook the fact that Marx is a materialist dialectical thinker when he 
approaches the seemingly unified concept-phenomenon money. It is not the unilinear pro- 
gressive account of the emergence of the money-form (Goux's model) that is Marx's main 
"discovery." It is in the full account of value-formation that the textuality of Marx's argument 
(rather than the recuperable continuist schema) and the place of use value is demonstrated, 
and the predication of the subject as labor-power (irreducible structural super-adequation- 
the subject defined by its capacity to produce more than itself) shows its importance. 
(To draw an adequate analogy between the emergence of the money-form and the 
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Oedipal scenario is also to conserve the European Marx. It is in my political interest to join 
forces with those Marxists who would rescue Marxism from its European provenance. It is 
not surprising that in a later book Goux argues for a kinship between Marx and Freud in 
terms of their Jewish heritage. This argument may well be cogent, but it should not be seen 
as clinching the question of the historical differential in the geopolitical situation of Marxism 
and psychoanalysis.) 
In comparison to these problems, the problem of winning Marx over to structuralist for- 
malism would be a minor one, were it not that Anglo-U.S. continuist interests tend to lump 
together all attempts to read Marx in a structuralist way. The main enemy is here seen to be 
Althusser. Although I am critical of Althusser in many details of his argument, I would also 
pay tribute to a certain forgotten Althusser, precisely against the spirit of constructing phan- 
tom scapegoats, a personality-cultism in reverse.5 Derrida innocently contributes to this by 
putting Althusser and Goux together in "White Mythology." If one looks up nothing but the 
references given by Derrida to certain passages in Reading Capital, one sees immediately 
that Althusser's attempt, for better or for worse, is to read Marx's text through the straining 
logic of the metaphors in the Marxian text. Goux's continuist reading proceeds by way of 
certain slippages. I will draw my discussion of Goux to a close by citing only one: It seems 
unwise to suggest, as Goux does, that because exchange springs up within what is 
superfluous to a person's use, the exclusion of the universal symbol of value (the money- 
material) from the commodity function is therefore due to being-in-excess. By the Marxian 
argument, all value is in excess of use-value. But Value is not therefore excluded. The univer- 
sal symbol measures this excess (or "deficit," as Goux correctly notes) and is excluded from 
the commodity function so that it does not, inconveniently, operate on two registers at once, 
both measuring and carrying Value. (The only limited analogy here is that the theory of the 
phallus must exclude its penis-function.) This is to collapse value, exchange-value, surplus- 
value and money by way of an inflation of the concept of excess. In fact Goux, when he 
notices Marx's frequent metaphorizations of money as monarch, seems to elide the impor- 
tant differences between value-theory and theories of state formation. 
In opening the lid of Money as a seemingly unitary phenomenon, Marx discovers a 
forever-seething chain in the pot: Value- Money- Capital. As in Hegel - of course Marx is 
not always a Hegelian but he seems to be here-those arrows are not irreversible. Logical 
schemes are not necessarily identical with chronological ones. But for purposes of 
philosophical cogitation and revolutionary agitation, the self-determination of the concept 
capital can be turned backward and forward and every which way. (Perhaps it was the 
relative ease of the former and the insurmountable difficulties of the latter that led Marx to 
question philosophical justice itself.) Keeping this in mind, let us flesh the seething chain 
with names of relationships: 
5One of the chief complaints against Althusser is his privileging of "science" over "ideology," and his cut- 
ting up Marx into an earlier ideological and a later scientific thinker. I would submit that, in the spirit of a 
critique of positivism, Althusser [bricole-s or] tinkers with the name of science itself, re-constellates it by 
spinning it out [filer] as a convenient metaphor even as he establishes Marx's claim to be a scientist rather 
than merely a philosopher of history: "When I say that Marx organized a theoretical system of scientific 
concepts in the domain previously monopolized by philosophies of history, I am spinning out [filons] a 
metaphor which is no more than a metaphor." This allows him to chart out the two great continents of 
science: physics (nature) and mathematics (idea). Marx inaugurates a science of history (humankind) 
because he proposes rules by which the metaleptic semiosis of history as account might be deciphered. It 
is not seen by Althusser as an authoritative inductive leap: "Obviously this epistemological break is not ex- 
actly locatable [ponctuel]. . . [it] inaugurates a history that will never come to an end." According to 
Althusser, Lenin consolidates this into a clear-cut program: "Lenin thus defines the ultimate essence of 
philosophical practice as an intervention in the theoretical domain. This intervention takes a double 
form: it is theoretical in its formulation of definite categories; and practical in the function of these 
categories." This is a "wild practice" ([pratique sauvage] on the analogy of "la psychanalyse sauvage" or 
pop psych). Althusser "generalizes this" into a (new) practice of philosophy, which recognizes that tradi- 
tional philosophy is the arena of a denegation and a game played for the high stakes of scientificity. In this 
context, the terms "ideology" and "science," far from being a frozen and loaded binary opposition, are 
terms that must be thought over again and again (Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster [New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1971], 38-40, 61, 66). The relationship between the theory of subject-formation 
in Lacanian psychoanalysis and the Althusserian critique of ideology, or between Freudian notions of 
overdetermination and Althusser's emendation of the theory of contradictions, is established by way of a 
developed argument, not, as in Coux, by an isomorphic analogy. 
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Value representation Money transformation Capital. 
(My account here is a rough summary of "The Chapter on Money," and section 1 of "The 
Chapter on Capital" in the Grundrisse.) This chain is "textual" in the general sense on at least 
two counts.6 The two ends are open, and the unified names of the relationships harbor 
discontinuities. 
Exigencies of space will not permit elaboration of what is at any rate obvious- from the 
details of everyday life, through the practical mechanics of crisis-management, to the tough 
reasonableness of a book like Beyond the Waste Land (eds. Samuel Bowles et al.) -that the 
self-determination of capital as such is to date open-ended at the start. That moment is 
customarily sealed off in conventional Marxist political economic theory by extending the 
chain one step: 
Labor representation Value representation transformation Labor Value Money Capital. 
In fact, the basic premise of the recent critique of the labor theory of value is predicated on 
the assumption that, according to Marx, Value represents Labor.7 
Yet the definition of Value in Marx establishes it as not only a representation but also a 
differential. What is represented or represents itself in the commodity-differential is Value: 
"In the exchange-relation of commodities their exchange-value appeared to us as totally in- 
dependent of their use-value. But if we abstract their use-value from the product of labor, we 
obtain their value, as it has just been defined. The common element that represents itself 
(sich darstellt) in the exchange-relation of the exchange-value of the commodity, is thus 
value" [Capital 1 128; translation modified]. Marx is writing, then, of a differential represent- 
ing itself or being represented by an agency ("we") no more fixable than the empty and ad 
hoc place of the investigator or community of investigators (in the fields of economics, plan- 
ning, business management). Only the continuist urge that I have already described can 
represent this differential as representing labor, even if "labor" is taken only to imply "as ob- 
jectified in the commodity." It can be justly claimed that one passage in Capital I cannot be 
adduced to bear the burden of an entire argument. We must, however, remember that we 
are dealing here with the definitive passage on Value upon which Marx placed his im- 
primatur. For ease of argument and calculation, it is precisely the subtle openendedness at 
the origin of the economic chain or text seen in this passage that Marx must himself 
sometimes jettison; or, for perspectivizing the argument, must "transform." (For a considera- 
tion of the "transformation" problem in this sense, see Richard D. Wolff et al., "Marx's (Not 
Ricardo's) 'Transformation Problem': A Radical Conceptualization," History of Political 
Economy 14:4 [1982].) 
I will presently go on to argue that the complexity of the notion of use-value also prob- 
lematizes the origin of the chain of value. Let us now consider the discontinuities harbored 
by the unified terms that name the relationships between the individual semantemes on that 
chain. Such resident discontinuities also textualize the chain. 
First, the relationship named "representation" between Value and Money. Critics like 
Goux or Marc Shell comment on the developmental narrative entailed by the emergence of 
the Money-form as the general representer of Value and establish an adequate analogy be- 
tween this narrative on the one hand and narratives of psycho-sexuality or language- 
production on the other. (See Marc Shell, Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and 
6Textual criticism of this sort assumes, a) in the narrow sense, that even "theoretical" texts are produced 
in language, and, b) that "reality" is a fabrication out of discontinuities and constitutive differences with 
"origins" and "ends" that are provisional and shifting. "One no longer has a tripartition between a field of 
reality, the world, a field of representation, the book, and a field of subjectivity, the author. But an ar- 
rangement [agencement] puts in connection certain multiplicities drawn in each of these orders, so 
much that a book does not have its continuation in the following book nor its object in the world, nor yet 
its subject in one or more authors" [Deleuze and Guattari, Mille plateaux 34; translation mine]. 
71 refer to this critique at greater length below. Here a brief checklist will suffice: Piero Sraffa, Produc- 
tion of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Cambridge: Cambridge. University Press, 1960); Samir 
Amin, The Law of Value and Historical Materialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978); Diane 
Elson, ed., Value: The Representation of Labor in Capitalism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 
1979); lan Steedman, Marx After Sraffa (London: Verso Edition, 1981); lan Steedman, et al., The Value 
Controversy (London: Verso Edition, 1981). 
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Philosophical Economies From the Medieval to the Modern Era. It should be remarked that 
Shell's narrative account of the history of money is less subtle than Marx's analysis of it.) My 
focus is on Marx's effort to open up the seemingly unified phenomenon of Money through 
the radical methodology of the dialectic-opening up, in other words, the seemingly 
positive phenomenon of money through the work of the negative. At each moment of the 
three-part perspective, Marx seems to indicate the possibility of an indeterminacy rather than 
stop at a contradiction, which is the articulative driving force of the dialectical morphology. 
Here is the schema, distilled from the Grundrisse: 
Position: The money commodity-the precious metal as medium of universal ex- 
change - is posited through a process of separation from its own being as a commodity ex- 
changeable for itself: "From the outset they represent superfluity, the form in which wealth 
originally appears [urspringlich erscheint]" [Grundrisse 166; translation modified]. As it 
facilitates commodity exchange "the simple fact that the commodity exists doubly, in one 
aspect as a specific product whose natural form of existence ideally contains (latently con- 
tains) its exchange value, and in the other aspect as manifest exchange value (money), in 
which all connection with the natural form of the product is stripped away again-this 
double, differentiated existence must develop into a difference" [147]. When the traffic of ex- 
change is in labor-power as commodity, the model leads not only to difference but to indif- 
ference: "In the developed system of exchange . . . the ties of personal dependence, of 
distinctions, of education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up ... ; and individuals seem in- 
dependent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more cor- 
rectly called indifference [Gleichg altgkeit- im Sinne der Indifferenz -Marx emphasizes the 
philosophical quality of indifference]" [163]. 
Negation: Within circulation seen as a constantly repeated circle or totality, money is a 
vanishing moment facilitating the exchange of two commodities. Here its independent 
positing is seen as "a negative relation to circulation," for, "cut off from all relation to [circula- 
tion], it would not be money, but merely a simple natural object" [217]. In this moment of 
appearance its positive identity is negated in a more subtle way as well: "If a fake ? were to 
circulate in the place of a real one, it would render absolutely the same service in circulation 
as a whole as if it were genuine" [210]. In philosophical language: the self-adequation of the 
idea, itself contingent upon a negative relationship, here between the idea of money and cir- 
culation as totality, works in the service of a functional in-adequation (fake = real). 
Negation of negation: Realization, where the actual quantity of money matters and 
capital accumulation starts. Yet here too the substantive specificity is contradicted (as it is not 
in unproductive hoarding). For, "to dissolve the things accumulated in individual gratifica- 
tions is to realize them" [234]. In other words, logical progression to accumulation can only 
be operated by its own rupture, releasing the commodity from the circuit of capital produc- 
tion into consumption in a simulacrum of use-value. 
I am suggesting that Marx indicates the possibility of an indeterminacy rather than only 
a contradiction at each of these three moments constitutive of the chain 
Value representation Money transtormation Capital. 
This textualization can be summarized as follows: the utopian socialists seemed to be work- 
ing on the assumption that money is the root of all evil: a positive origin. Marx applies the 
dialectic to this root and breaks it up through the work of the negative. At each step of the 
dialectic something seems to lead off into the openendedness of textuality: indifference, in- 
adequation, rupture. (Here Derrida's implied critique of the dialectic as organized by the 
movement of semantemes and by the strategic exclusion of syncategoremes ["White 
Mythology" 270] would support the conduct of Marx's text.) 
Let us move next to the relationship named "transformation between Money and 
Capital," a relationship already broached in the previous link. (This is not identical with the 
"transformation problem" in economics.) An important locus of discontinuity here is the so- 
called primitive or originary accumulation. Marx's own account emphasizes the discontinu- 
ity in comical terms, and then resolves it by invoking a process rather than an origin: 
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We have seen how money is transformed into capital; how surplus-value is made 
through capital, and how more capital is made from surplus-value. But the ac- 
cumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes 
capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of con- 
siderable masses of capital and labor-power in the hands of commodity producers. 
The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, 
which we can only get out of by assuming a "primitive" [urspriinglich: originary] ac- 
cumulation . .. which precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is 
not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure. This 
primitive accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as 
original sin does in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the 
human race. [Capital I 873] 
Marx's resolution: 
The capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and 
the ownership of the conditions for the realization of their labor .... So-called 
primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of 
divorcing the producer from the means of production. [Capital 1 874-75] 
This method of displacing questions of origin into questions of process is part of Marx's 
general Hegelian heritage, as witness his early treatment, in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, of the question: "Who begot the first man, and nature in general?" [Early 
Writings 357]. 
When, however, capital is fully developed - the structural moment when the process of 
extraction, appropriation, and realization of surplus-value begins to operate with no extra- 
economic coercions- capital logic emerges to give birth to capital as such. This moment 
does not arise either with the coercive extraction of surplus-value in pre-capitalist modes of 
production, or with the accumulation of interest capital or merchant's capital (accumulation 
out of buying cheap and selling dear). The moment, as Marx emphasizes, entails the 
historical possibility of the definitive predication of the subject as labor-power. Indeed, it is 
possible to suggest that the "freeing" of labor-power may be a description of the social 
possibility of this predication. Here the subject is predicated as structurally super-adequate to 
itself, definitively productive of surplus-labor over necessary labor. And because it is this 
necessary possibility of the subject's definitive super-adequation that is the origin of capital as 
such, Marx makes the extraordinary suggestion that Capital consumes the use-value of labor- 
power. If the critique of political economy were simply a question of restoring a society of 
use-value, this would be an aporetic moment. "Scientific socialism" contrasts itself to a "uto- 
pian socialism" committed to such a restoration by presupposing labor outside of capital 
logic or wage-labor. The radical heterogeneity entailed in that presupposition was dealt with 
only very generally by Marx from the early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts on- 
wards. Indeed, it may perhaps be said that, in revolutionary practice, the "interest" in social 
justice "unreasonably" introduces the force of illogic into the good use-value fit-philo- 
sophical justice- between Capital and Free Labor. If pursued to its logical consequence, 
revolutionary practice must be persistent because it can carry no theoretico-teleological 
justification. It is perhaps not altogether fanciful to call this situation of open-endedness an 
insertion into textuality. The more prudent notion of associated labor in maximized social 
productivity working according to "those foundations of the forms that are common to all 
social modes of production" is an alternative that restricts the force of such an insertion 
[Capital III 1016]. 
In the continuist romantic anti-capitalist version, it is precisely the place of use-value 
(and simple exchange or barter based on use-value) that seems to offer the most secure an- 
chor of social "value" in a vague way, even as academic economics reduces use-value to 
mere physical co-efficients. This place can happily accommodate word-processors (of which 
more later) as well as independent commodity production (hand-sewn leather sandals), our 
students' complaint that they read literature for pleasure not interpretation, as well as most of 
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our "creative" colleagues' amused contempt for criticism beyond the review, and main- 
stream critics' hostility to "theory." In my reading, on the other hand, it is use-value that puts 
the entire textual chain of Value into question and thus allows us a glimpse of the possibility 
that even textualization (which is already an advance upon the control implicit in linguistic 
or semiotic reductionism) may be no more than a way of holding randomness at bay. 
For use-value, in the classic way of deconstructive levers, is both outside and inside the 
system of value-determinations (for a discussion of deconstructive "levers," see Derrida, Posi- 
tions 71). It is outside because it cannot be measured by the labor theory of value- it is out- 
side of the circuit of exchange: "A thing can be a use-value without being a value" [Capital I 
131]. It is, however, not altogether outside the circuit of exchange. Exchange-value, which in 
some respects is the species-term of Value, is also a superfluity or a parasite of use-value: 
"This character (of exchange) does not yet dominate production as a whole, but concerns 
only its superfluity and is hence itself more or less superfluous . . . an accidental enlargement 
of the sphere of satisfactions, enjoyments .... It therefore takes place only at a few points 
(originally at the borders of the natural communities, in their contact with strangers" 
[Grundrisse 204]. 
The part-whole relationship is here turned inside out. (Derrida calls this "invagination." 
See "The Law of Genre," Glyph 7 [1980]. My discussion of "invagination is to be found in 
Displacement: Derrida and After, ed. Mark Krupnick 186-89.) The parasitic part (exchange- 
value) is also the species term of the whole, thus allowing use-value the normative inside 
place of the host as well as banishing it as that which must be subtracted so that Value can be 
defined. Further, since one case of use-value can be that of the worker wishing to consume 
the (affect of the) work itself, that necessary possibility renders indeterminate the "materialist" 
predication of the subject as labor-power or super-adequation as calibrated and organized 
by the logic of capital. In terms of that necessarily possible "special case," this predication can 
no longer be seen as the excess of surplus labor over socially necessary labor. The question 
of affectively necessary labor brings in the attendant question of desire and thus questions in 
yet another way the mere philosophical justice of capital logic without necessarily shifting 
into utopian idealism. 
If a view of affectively necessary labor (as possible within the present state of socialized 
consumer capitalism) as labor as such is proposed without careful attention to the interna- 
tional division of labor, its fate may be a mere political avant-gardism. This, in spite of its 
sincere evocations of the world economic system, is, I believe, a possible problem with 
Antonio Negri's theory of zerowork.8 The resistance of the syncategoremes strategically ex- 
cluded from the system so that the great semantemes can control its morphology (Derrida) 
can perhaps be related to the heterogeneity of use-value as a private grammar. For Derrida, 
however, capital is generally interest-bearing commercial capital. Hence surplus-value for 
him is the super-adequation of capital rather than a "materialist" predication of the subject as 
super-adequate to itself. This restricted notion can only lead to "idealist" analogies between 
capital and subject, or commodity and subject. 
The concept of socially necessary labor is based on an identification of subsistence and 
reproduction. Necessary labor is the amount of labor required by the worker to "reproduce" 
himself in order to remain optimally useful for capital in terms of the current price-structure. 
Now if the dynamics of birth-growth-family-life reproduction is given as much attention as, 
let us say, the relationship between fixed and variable capitals in their several moments, the 
"materialist" predication of the subject as labor-power is rendered indeterminate in another 
way, without therefore being "refuted" by varieties of utopianism and "idealism." This expan- 
sion of the textuality of value has often gone unrecognized by feminists as well as 
mainstream Marxists, when they are caught within hegemonic positivism or orthodox dialec- 
8For excellent elaborations of this theory, see the "Introduction"-s and indeed the entire issues of 
Zerowork: Political Materials 1 & 2 (December 1975 and Fall 1977). One of the most revolutionary sug- 
gestions of this thought is that the working class includes the unwaged as well as the waged. I am sug- 
gesting that the unwaged under socialized capital has a different status and definition from the unwaged 
in the peripheral capitalisms. 
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tics.9 They have sometimes tried to close off the expansion, by considering it as an opposi- 
tion (between Marxism and feminism), or by way of inscribing, in a continuist spirit, the 
socializing or ideology-forming functions of the family as direct means of producing the 
worker and thus involved in the circuit of the production of surplus-value for the capitalist. 
They have also attempted to legitimize domestic labor within capital logic. Most of these 
positions arise from situational exigencies. My own involvement with them does not permit 
critical distance, as witness in the last page of this essay. That these closing off gestures are 
situationally admirable is evident from the practical difficulty of offering alternatives to them. 
Let us consider the final item in the demonstration of the "textuality" of the chain of 
value. We have remarked that in circulation as totality, or the moment of negation in Marx's 
reading of money, money is seen as in a negative relation to circulation because, "cut off 
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Circulation as such has the morphological (if not the "actual") power to insert Money back 
into Nature, and to banish it from the textuality of Value. Yet it is also circulation that bestows 
textuality upon the Money-form. Textuality as a structural description indicates the work of 
differentiation (both plus and minus) that opens up identity-as-adequation. Circulation in the 
following passage does precisely that with the restricted circuit of adequation within the 
money-form itself: "You may turn and toss an ounce of gold in any way you like, and it will 
never weigh ten ounces. But here in the process of circulation one ounce practically does 
weigh ten ounces." Marx describes this phenomenon as the "Dasein" of the coin as "value 
sign" [Wertzeichen]. "The circulation of money is an outer movement [auBere 
Bewegung] .... In the friction with all kinds of hands, pouches, pockets, purses ... the coin 
rubs off 
.... 
By being used it gets used up" [A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy 108; the translation of "Dasein" as "the work it performs" seems puzzling]. 
If in its first dialectical "moment," circulation has the morphological potential of cancel- 
ing Money back into Nature, in its third "moment" it is shown to run the risk of being itself 
9One striking exception is Diane Elson, "The Value Theory of Labour," in Elson, ed., Value. I propose 
something similar in "Feminism and Critical Theory," forthcoming in For Alma Mater, Paula Treichler 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press). 
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sublated into Mind: "The continuity of production presupposes that circulation time has 
been sublated [aufgehoben]. The nature of capital presupposes that it travels through the dif- 
ferent phases of circulation not as it does in the idea-representation [Vorstellung] where one 
concept turns into the other at the speed of thought [mit Gedankenschnelle], in no time, but 
rather as situations which are separated in terms of time" [Grundrisse 548; translation 
modified]. By thus sublating circulation into Mind, production (of Value) as continuous total- 
ity would annul Value itself. For Value would not be value if it were not realized in consump- 
tion, strictly speaking, outside of the circuit of production. Thus capital, as the most ad- 
vanced articulation of value "presupposes that it travels through different phases." The 
scheme is made problematic by the invagination of use-value, as discussed earlier in this 
essay. 
Has circulation time of capital been sublated into the speed of Mind (and more) within 
telecommunication? Has (the labor theory of) Value become obsolete in micro-electronic 
capitalism? Let us mark these tantalizing questions here. I shall consider them at greater 
length below. 
The consideration of the textuality of Value in Marx, predicated upon the subject as 
labor-power, does not answer the onto-phenomenological question "What is Value?," 
although it gives us a sense of the complexity of the mechanics of evaluation and value- 
formation. It shows us that the Value-form in the general sense and in the narrow-the 
economic sphere as commonly understood being the latter-are irreducibly complicitous. It 
implies the vanity of dismissing considerations of the economic as "reductionism." I have 
already indicated various proposed formulations that have the effect of neutralizing these 
suggestions: to find in the development of the money-form an adequate analogy to the 
psychoanalytic narrative; to see in it an analogy to metaphor or language; to subsume 
domestic or intellectual labor into a notion of the production of value expanded within 
capital logic. What narratives of value-formation emerge when consciousness itself is sub- 
sumed under the "materialist" predication of the subject? 
If consciousness within the "idealist" analogy is seen as necessarily superadequate to 
itself by way of intentionality, we can chart the emergence of ad hoc universal equivalents 
that measure the production of value in what we may loosely call "thought." Like the banish- 
ment of the money-commodity from the commodity-function, these equivalents can no 
longer themselves be treated as "natural examples." (Because these analogies are necessarily 
loose, one cannot be more specific in that last phrase.) One case of such a universal 
equivalent is "universal humanity"-both psychological and social-as the touchstone of 
value in literature and society. It is only half in jest that one would propose that the "credit" 
of certain "major" literatures is represented by capital-accumulation in terms of the various 
transformations of this universal equivalent. "Pure theory," within the Althusserian model of 
"theoretical production," may be seen as another case of a universal equivalent. The 
relativization of Value as a regression into the narrative stage where any commodity could be 
"cathected" as the value-form is, to follow Goux's analogy, the Freudian stage of poly- 
morphous perversion, and can be channeled into aesthetics as varied as those of symbolism 
and post-modernism. 
I have already commented on Goux's gloss on the Freudo-Lacanian narrative of the 
emergence of the phallus-in-the-genital stage as the universal equivalent of value. Nietzsche 
in The Genealogy of Morals gives us two moments of the separation and transformation of an 
item from within the common circuit of exchange. They are worth mentioning because The 
Genealogy of Morals is Nietzsche's systematic attempt at a "critique of moral values," a 
"put[ting] in question [in Frage stellen ]" of "the value of these values" [Grundrisse 348; transla- 
tion modified]. The Nietzschean enterprise is not worked out on what I call a "materialist" 
subject-predication as labor-power, but rather by way of a critique of the "idealist" subject- 
predication as consciousness, through the double determinants of "philology" and 
"physiology" [Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo 20]. Because it is a 
reinscription of the history of value as obliterated and discontinuous semiotic chains-ongo- 
ing sign-chains-disconnected references to money (guilt and punishment as systems of ex- 
change), and to the inscription of coins, abound. The more crucial moment, the separation 
of the money-commodity, is touched upon once at the "beginning" and once at the in- 
auguration of the "present," as the separation of the scapegoat and the sublation of that 
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gesture into mercy respectively. That sublation is notoriously the moment of the creditor 
sacrificing himself for the debtor in the role of God's son in the Christ story [On the 
Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo 77, 72]. (Any notions of "beginning" and "present" in 
Nietzsche are made problematic by the great warning against a successful genealogical 
method: "All concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude defini- 
tion; only that which has no history is definable" [ibid. 80].) 
I think there can be no doubt that it is this separation rather than inscription or coining 
that is for Marx the philosophically determining moment in the discourse of value. Attention 
to Marx's concept-metaphor of the foreign language is interesting here. Often in our discus- 
sion of language the word seems to retain a capital "L" even when it is spelled in the lower 
case or re-written as parole. Using a necessarily pre-critical notion of language, which sug- 
gests that in the mother-tongue "word" is inseparable from "reality," Marx makes the highly 
sophisticated suggestion that the development of the value-form separates "word" and "real- 
ity" (signifier and signified), a phenomenon that may be appreciated only in the learning of a 
foreign language: "To compare money with language is . . . erroneous .... Ideas which 
have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to cir- 
culate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy; but the analogy 
then lies not in language, but in the foreignness of language" [Grundrisse 163. If this were a 
technical discussion where it was necessary to respect the specificity of the vocabulary of 
linguistics, I would not of course, equate word/reality and signifier/signified.] It is certainly of 
interest that, using a necessarily post-monetary notion of Value-in-exchange, which must 
suggest that "political economy [is] . . concerned with a system of equivalence [systeme 
d'6quivalence] . .. [between a specific] labor and [a specific] wage [un travail et un salaire]," 
Saussure shows us that, even in the mother tongue, it is the work of difference that remains 
originary, that even as it is most "native," language is always already "foreign," that even in its 
"incorporeal essence," "the linguistic signifier... [is] constituted not by its material 
substance but only [uniquement] by the differences that separate its acoustic image from all 
others" [Course in General Linguistics 79, 118-19]. 
The binary opposition between the economic and the cultural is so deeply entrenched 
that the full implications of the question of Value posed in terms of the "materialist" predica- 
tion of the subject are difficult to conceptualize. One cannot foresee a teleological moment 
when these implications are catastrophically productive of a new evaluation. The best one 
can envisage is the persistent undoing of the opposition, taking into account the fact that, 
first, the complicity between cultural and economic value-systems is acted out in almost 
every decision we make; and, secondly, that economic reductionism is, indeed, a very real 
danger. It is a paradox that capitalist humanism does indeed tacitly make its plans by the 
"materialist" predication of Value, even as its official ideology offers the discourse of 
humanism as such; while Marxist cultural studies in the First World cannot ask the question 
of Value within the "materialist" predication of the subject, since the question would compel 
one to acknowledge that the text of exploitation might implicate Western cultural studies in 
the international division of labor.10 Let us, if somewhat fancifully, invoke the word- 
processor again. It is an extremely convenient and efficient tool for the production of writing. 
It certainly allows us to produce a much larger quantity of writing in a much shorter time and 
makes fiddling with it much easier. The "quality" of writing-the "idealist" question of 
value-as well as the use-value of manual composition-affectively necessary labor-are 
rendered irrelevant here. (It is of course not to be denied that the word-processor might itself 
generate affective use-value.) From within the "idealist" camp, one can even say, in the wake 
of a trend that runs from Professor A. B. Lord to Father Walter J. Ong, the following: we were 
not in on the "inception" of writing, and can copiously deplore the harm it did to the orality 
of the verbal world; we are, however, present at the inception of telecommunication, and, 
being completely encompassed by the historical ideology of efficiency, we are unable to 
'0Hazel Carby, et al., eds., The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchin- 
son, 1982) is a significant exception. Not only are the authors aware of the connection between racism in 
Britain and the international division of labor; they are also aware that a study of race relations in Britain 
cannot pretend to be a general study of the Third World. 
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reckon with the transformations wrought by the strategic exclusions of the randomness of 
bricolage operated by programming (see A. B. Lord, The Singer of Tales; Walter J. Ong, Oral- 
ity and Literacy). 
These are not the objections that I emphasize. I draw attention, rather, to the fact that, 
even as circulation time attains the apparent instantaneity of thought (and more), the con- 
tinuity of production ensured by that attainment of apparent coincidence must be broken up 
by capital: its means of doing so is to keep the labor reserves in the comprador countries out- 
side of this instantaneity, thus to make sure that multinational investment does not realize 
itself fully there through assimilation of the working class into consumerist-humanism.1I It is 
one of the truisms of Capital I that technological inventions open the door to the production 
of relative rather than absolute surplus-value. [Capital I 643-54. "Absolute surplus-value" is a 
methodologically irreducible theoretical fiction.] Since the production and realization of 
relative surplus-value, usually attendant upon technological progress and the socialized 
growth of consumerism, increase capital expenditure in an indefinite spiral, there is the con- 
tradictory drive within capitalism to produce more absolute and less relative surplus-value as 
part of its crisis management. In terms of this drive, it is in the "interest" of capital to preserve 
the comprador theater in a state of relatively primitive labor legislation and environmental 
regulation. Further, since the optimal relationship between fixed and variable capital has 
been disrupted by the accelerated rate of obsolescence of the former under the rapid prog- 
ress within telecommunications research and the attendant competition, the comprador 
theater is also often obliged to accept scrapped and out-of-date machinery from the post- 
industrialist economies. To state the problem in the philosophical idiom of this essay: as the 
subject as super-adequation in labor-power seems to negate itself within telecommunica- 
tion, a negation of the negation is continually produced by the shifting lines of the interna- 
tional division of labor. This is why any critique of the labor theory of value, pointing at the 
unfeasibility of the theory under post-industrialism, or as a calculus of economic indicators, 
ignores the dark presence of the Third World.12 
It is a well-known fact that the worst victims of the recent exacerbation of the interna- 
tional division of labor are women. They are the true surplus army of labor in the current 
conjuncture. In their case, patriarchal social relations contribute to their production as the 
new focus of super-exploitation (see June Nash and Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, eds., 
Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor). As I have suggested above, to con- 
sider the place of sexual reproduction and the family within those social relations should 
show the pure (or free) "materialist" predication of the subject to be gender-exclusive. 
The literary academy emphasizes when necessary that the American tradition at its best 
is one of individual Adamism and the loosening of frontiers.13 In terms of political activism 
within the academy, this free spirit exercises itself at its best by analyzing and calculating 
predictable strategic effects of specific measures of resistance: boycotting consumer items, 
" There is a steadily growing body of work dealing with this phenomenon, a glimpse of which may be 
found in journals such as NACLA, The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, and Economic and Political 
Weekly. A bibliographical starting point would be Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, eds., Im- 
perialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), Part I; Samir Amin, 
Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third 
World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) and The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1982). 
12See Deborah Fahy Bryceson, "Use Value, The Law of Value and the Analysis of Non-Capitalist Produc- 
tion," Capital & Class 20(Summer 1983). (1 have differences of theoretical detail with Bryceson which are 
immaterial to my argument here.) My account of the "Third World" here is of the predominant 
"peripheral capitalist model of development," which works through "an alliance of imperialism with the 
local exploiting classes" (Samir Amin, The Future of Maoism, trans. Norman Finkelstein [New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1982], 9-10). 
131n spite of necessary qualifications, this argument underlies much of the criticism relating to the U.S. 
nineteenth century and a certain twentieth century. A general line may be traced from F. O. Matthiessen, 
American Renaissance: Art and Expression in The Age of Emerson and Whitman (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1941), through R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy and Tradition 
in the 19th Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), to, say, Sherman Paul's The Lost 
America of Love (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). 
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demonstrating against investments in countries with racist domestic politics, uniting against 
genocidal foreign policy. Considering the role of telecommunication in entrenching the in- 
ternational division of labor and the oppression of women, this free spirit should subject its 
unbridled passion for subsidizing computerized information retrieval and theoretical pro- 
duction to the same conscientious scrutiny. The "freeing" of the subject as super-adequation 
in labor-power entails an absence of extra-economic coercion. Because a positivist vision 
can only recognize the latter, that is to say, domination, within post-industrial cultures like 
the U.S., telecommunication seems to bring nothing but the promise of infinite liberty for the 
subject. Economic coercion as exploitation is hidden from sight in "the rest of the world." 
These sentiments expressed at a public forum drew from a prominent U.S. leftist the 
derisive remark: "She will deny the workers their capuccino!" I am not in fact suggesting that 
literary critics should be denied word-processors. My point is that the question of Value in its 
"materialist" articulation must be asked as the capuccino-drinking worker and the word- 
processing critic actively forget the actual price-in-exploitation of the machine producing 
coffee and words. This is certainly not required of every literary critic. But if the literary critic 
in the U.S. today decides to ask the question of Value only within the frame allowed by an 
unacknow'edged "nationalist" view of "productivity," she cannot be expected to be taken 
seriously everywhere. (The real problem is, of course, that she will be taken seriously, and 
the work of multinational ideology-reproduction will go on.) If my position here is mistaken 
for an embarrassing economic determinism, the following specification may be made: 
"There is a short-of and beyond of [economic determinism]. To see to it that the beyond does 
not become the within is to recognize . . . the need of a communicating pathway (parcours). 
That pathway has to leave a wake (sillage) in the text. Without that wake or track, aban- 
doned to the simple content of its conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text"-the discourse 
of textuality in the economic that I have been at pains to explicate and disclose-"will so 
closely resemble the pre-critical text"- economic determinism-"as to be indistinguishable 
from it. We must now meditate upon the law of this resemblance" [Derrida, Of Gram- 
matology 61]. I have done no more in this essay than to encourage such a meditation, to sug- 
gest that, following Marx, it is possible to put the economic text "under erasure," to see, that 
is, the unavoidable and pervasive importance of its operation and yet to question it as a con- 
cept of the last resort. (Incidentally, this also emphasizes that putting "under erasure" is as 
much an affirmative as a negative gesture.) In 1985, Walter Benjamin's famous saying, "there 
has never been a document of culture which was not at one and the same time a document 
of barbarism" [Illuminations 256] should be a starting rather than a stopping-point for Marxist 
axiological investigations. A "culturalism" that disavows the economic in its global operations 
cannot get a grip on the concomitant production of barbarism. 
If, on the other hand, the suggestion is made that in the long run, through the multina- 
tionals, everyone will have word-processors and capuccino (not to mention guns and butter), 
the evaluating critic must be prepared to enter the debate between Samir Amin and the late 
Bill Warren, some of the broad strokes of which I have outlined above [see Warren, Im- 
perialism: Pioneer of Capitalism; Amin, "Expansion or Crisis of Capitalism?]. She must be 
prepared to admit that the unification churches being projected by the mechanisms of Euro- 
currency and "the globalization of markets" (we read it as "global crisis") do not lend much 
credibility to this uninstructed hope. 
Perhaps a word on "The Globalization of Markets," an article by Theodore Levitt, 
Edward W. Carter Professor of Business Administration and head of the marketing area at the 
Harvard Business School, is in order here. The piece is exemplary of many of the attitudes I 
have tried to define. Since Professor Levitt writes from the point of view of big business ("peo- 
ple and nations" in the passage cited below) he is not concerned with the active divisiveness 
of the international division of labor. Here is his theory of the relationship between money 
and the division of labor, and his theory of money as a unified concept, reached in turn by 
way of "experience" as a fetishized concept: "Nobody takes scarcity lying down; everyone 
wants more. This in part explains division of labor and specialization of production. They 
enable people and nations to optimize their conditions [a deliberately vague word] through 
trade. The median [sic] is usually money. Experience teaches that money has three special 
diacritics / winter 1985 85 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:02:22 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
qualities: scarcity, difficulty of acquisition, and transience. People understandably treat it 
with respect."14 What I have been arguing is that this primitive notion of money must work 
complicitously with the contemporary sublation of money where it seems to question the 
"materialistic" predication of the subject; that the post-modern, in spite of all the cant of 
modernization, reproduces the "pre-modern" on another scene. In Professor Levitt's article 
the two views remain in an unresolved and distanced structural parataxis. To quote: "Today 
money is simply electronic impulses. With the speed of light [so much for Marx's impossible 
limit for circulation: speed of thought] it moves effortlessly between distant centers (and even 
lesser places). A change of ten basic points in the price of a bond causes an instant and 
massive shift of money from London to Tokyo. The system has profound impact on the way 
companies operate throughout the world" [Levitt 101]. 
The perspective here is unifocal and generally uncritically read (if read at all) by literary 
academics. I have been trying to explicate not only the parataxis above, but also the ex- 
ploitation condensed and monumentalized in a seemingly scientific phrase such as "scale- 
efficient conditions" below (incidentally, "value" as used here is the unified continuist ver- 
sion that would be consonant with the Marxian definition of value relieved of its historical, 
ethical, or philosophical charge): "The most endangered companies in the rapidly-evolving 
world tend to be those that dominate rather small domestic markets with high value-added 
products for which there are smaller markets elsewhere. With transportation costs"- the 
only costs specified -"proportionately low, distant competitors will now enter the now- 
sheltered markets of those companies with goods produced more cheaply under scale- 
efficient conditions" [Levitt 94]. These "globalizers" also have their human universals: "an an- 
cient motivation - to make one's money go as far as possible. This is universal - not simply a 
motivation but actually a need" [Levitt 96]. Yet, in an insane parody of the basic paradox of 
humanistic education, Levitt describes the epistemic violence of the universalizing global 
market: "The purpose of business is to get and keep a customer. Or, to use Peter Drucker's 
more refined construction, to create and keep a customer."5I 
14Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," Harvard Business Review 61:3(May-June, 1983):95. 
I am indebted to Dennis Dworkin for bringing this piece to my attention. 
islbid., 101. In terms of the ideological interpellation of the subject as consumer, it is worth remarking 
that the semiotic field here reproduces capitalist as well as patriarchal social relations faithfully: "The 
Customer" (who is male) does not know what he wants; "Managers [should not be] confidently wedded 
to a distorted version of the marketing concept according to which you give the customer what he says 
he wants." But, since the item under discussion here is an automatic washer, the actual target is, of 
course, "the homemaker" (who is female): "Hoover's media message should have been: This is the 
machine that you, the homemaker, deserve to have to reduce the repetitive heavy daily household 
burdens, so that you may have more constructive time to spend with your children and your husband. 
The promotion should also have targeted the husband to give him, preferably in the presence of his wife, 
a sense of obligation to provide an automatic washer for her even before he bought an automobile for 
himself. An aggressively low price, combined with heavy promotion of this kind, would have overcome 
previously expressed preferences for particular features" [98]. There is something like a relation between 
this ideological reproduction and reinforcement of the international division of labor in the discourse of 
patriarchal relations in consumerism, and the reproduction and reinforcement of the international divi- 
sion of labor in the discourse of feminist individualism within socialized capital. Examine, for instance, the 
following convincingly innocent and unproblematic evaluation of telecommunication in Ms in light of 
the axiology suggested by considerations of the "materialist " predication of the subject, which the readers 
of Ms cannot be expected to know since that magazine too is an ideological apparatus within the social 
arena under consideration. (Incidentally, it is interesting to see how the time-problematic is reversed 
within a "narrative" context, how the language of narrative-production in telecommunication seeks to 
recapture a naive "reality." This is a much longer argument which I hope to develop elsewhere.) "Roberta 
Williams didn 't know what she wanted to do with her life until she designed her first microcomputer 
adventure game three years ago. Today, she is one of the leading designers of home computer games and 
part owner . . of a $20 million business. . . . There is something exciting about the continuous motion 
in arcade games and to use 'real time' (industry lingo for the continuous action that is programmed into 
the game) within adventure games." Later in the same issue, speaking of "the search business" for women 
executives, the magazine uses some symptomatic metaphors. "The process is essentially match- 
making . . . You don't have to have that Dolly [Hello Dolly!] Levi commonsense instinct [read ideology 
at its strongest] of who-goes-with-whom, and also the diplomacy of Kissinger"[Ms 12:2(August 1983):20, 
73]. The relationship between feminist individualism and the military-industrial complex on the one 
hand, and the problem of anti-sexism within the capitalist enclosure being understood as feminism on the 
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This is how economic reductionism operates. The disavowal of the economic is its tacit 
and legitimizing collaborator. In its verdict on "the multinational mind" as opposed to the 
globalizing mind is to be heard the managerial version of shock at denying the workers of the 
First World their capuccino: "the multinational mind, warped into circumspection and 
timidity by years of stumbles and transnational troubles, now rarely challenges existing 
overseas practices. More often it considers any departure from inherited domestic routines 
as mindless, disrespectful, or impossible. It is the mind of a bygone day" [Levitt 101; italics 
mine]. 
I should like to construct a narrative here using "The Wiring of Wall Street," an article in 
the New York Times Sunday magazine for October 23, 1983. (I choose New York Times 
because the broad spectrum that contains the Sunday supplements of newspapers, Scientific 
American, Psychology Today, as well as the National Enquirer, constitutes part of an 
ideological apparatus, through which the consumer becomes knowledgeable, the subject of 
"cultural" explanation. Could one suggest that organs such as the Harvard Business Review 
are also part of the apparatus, in that through them the investor-manager receives his 
"ideology"? As I suggest in note 15, feminist individualist consumerism is being appropriated 
within the same apparatus.) 
After telecommunication, Wall Street seems to have saved by reconciliation (rather 
than deconstruction) the binary opposition between the immediate self-proximity of voice- 
consciousness and the visible efficiency of writing. As Georg Simmel already observes of the 
stock exchange at the end of the last century, it is the place where the circulation of money 
can be most speeded up: the "twofold condensation of values into the money form and of 
monetary transactions into the form of the stock exchange makes it possible for values to be 
rushed through the greatest number of hands in the shortest possible time" [Simmel 506]. 
"The start of a solution of the market's major dilemma, the management of time, appeared in 
1972 when the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and their member 
firms organized the Securities Industries Automation Corporation 
.... 
Not long ago, the ex- 
ecutives kept up with their investments on a monthly or weekly schedule; today, the report- 
ing can be instantaneous because of the computer" ["The Wiring of Wall Street" 47]. It is 
worth remarking that, even as time is thus being managed on the post-industrial capitalist 
front, high Marxist theory contests the labor theory of value by bracketing time as a vehicle 
of change: "No changes in output and ... no changes in the proportions in which different 
means of production are used by an industry are considered, so that no question arises as to 
the variation or constancy of returns" [Sraffa, Production of Commodities v]. If money then 
circulates at the speed of consciousness by way of the computer, it at the same time accedes 
to the visible efficiency of writing. "'We had this amorphous, unorganized, mostly invisible 
market prior to 1971' says Gordon S. Macklin, president of the [National] Association [of 
Securities Dealers]" ["Wiring" 73]. 
This reconciliation of the opposition between consciousness and writing obviously does 
not "refute" Freud's late proto-deconstructive model of the psyche as the Wunderblok or the 
mystic writing pad (see Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Writing and Difference). If 
anything, the silicon chip appears to give "a plastic idea" to that pure virtuality, that dif- 
ference as such which Derrida calls "the work of dead time" [the warning against the forma- 
tion of a plastic idea is to be found in Freud, The Standard Edition Vol. 4 281: the Derrida 
passage is in Of Grammatology 68]. 
But this is not the objection I emphasize here. I point out, rather, that the computer, 
even as it pushes the frontiers of rationalization, proves unable to achieve bricolage, to pro- 
duce a program that will use an item for a purpose for which it was not designed. (This is the 
celebrated problem of programming a computer to build nests with random materials, as a 
bird does, that exercises Douglas Hofstadter and others.) And it is well-known that radical 
proto-deconstructive cultural practice instructs us precisely to work through bricolage, to "re- 
constellate" cultural items by wrenching them out of their assigned function. When Walter 
other, is too overdetermined for me to deal with it in more than a footnote. The emergence of an unex- 
amined genitalist axiology of women 's suffering and universal sisterhood is also at issue here. What com- 
plicates the situation is the overarching presence of hegemonic masculism. 
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Benjamin writes: "What we require of the photographer is the ability to give his picture the 
caption that wrenches it from modish commerce and gives it a revolutionary use-value 
[Gebrauschswert]," he is implicitly "bricoling" or tinkering with a continuist notion of use- 
value (I need not repeat my earlier argument) even as he recommends bricolage as cultural 
practice. This recommendation can be traced from his earliest theory of allegory as the 
cathexis (or occupation) of ruins and fragments by the irreducible alterity of time [Benjamin, 
"The Author as Producer," Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings 230]. 
This is to be found in DeLeuze and Guattari's bold notion of originarily unworkable 
machines. It can be said for Derrida that, by positioning citationality as originary, he has 
radicalized bricolage as the questioning of all ideologies of adequation and legitimacy.16 
These positions are now trickling down into a reckoning with the emergent ideological 
possibilities of the post-modern cultural phenomenon within a post-modern political 
economy.17 
It is not even this possibility of a cultural theoretical practice, which sabotages the 
radically reconciling text of the post-modern stock exchange, that I emphasize within this 
narrative. My critique can find an allegorical summary in a passage about the old ticker-tape 
machine. "A holdover from the storied past is the old stock ticker. Fifteen minutes after 
trading has commenced, the ticker-a bit of technology that dates back to 1867-has 
already fallen behind the hectic trading by six minutes. Speed it up to match today's trading 
volume, and it would be a blur" ["Wiring" 47]. 
We cannot forget that Capital I is "a bit of technology that dates back to 1867," its date of 
publication. I have attempted to show that the Marxist historical narrative-"the storied 
past"- is far from a holdover. When it is expanded to accommodate the epistemic violence 
of imperialism as crisis-management, including its current displacements, it can allow us to 
read the text of political economy at large. When "speeded up" in this way it does not allow 
the irreducible rift of the International division of labor to blur. "The Wiring of Wall Street" 
speaks first of "time management" and next quotes Peter Solomon of Lehman Brothers 
"offer[ing] an explanation: 'Computers have shown us how to manage risk"' ["Wiring" 47]. 
The inconvenient and outdated ticker of Marxist theory discloses the excluded word be- 
tween "time" and "risk" in the management game: crisis. 
Let us retrieve the concept-metaphor of the text that we left behind a few pages back. 
Within this narrative replay of my argument in the previous pages it may be pointed out that, 
whereas Solomon Brothers, thanks to computers, "earned about $2 million for . . . 15 
minutes of work," the entire economic text would not be what it is if it could not write itself 
as a palimpsest upon another text where a woman in Sri Lanka has to work 2,287 minutes to 
buy a t-shirt. The "post-modern" and "pre-modern" are inscribed together. It should also be 
remarked that Simmel argued nearly a hundred years ago that a developed money-form 
naturally promotes "the individual": "if freedom means only obeying one's own laws, then 
the distance between property and its owner that is made possible by the money form of 
returns provides a hitherto unheard-of freedom" [Simmel 334]. The best beneficiary of this 
"post-modernization" of Wall Street is, predictably, the individual small investor in the 
United States. And the apparently history-transcendent "individual subject" who will "have 
to hold to the truth of postmodernism ... and have as its vocation the invention and projec- 
tion of a global cognitive mapping" [Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism" 92] will be, as long as no attempt is made to specify the post-modern space- 
specific subject-production, no other than a version of this unpromising individual. 
It is within this framework of crisis-management and regulation, then, that I would pro- 
pose to pursue the evaluation of the pervasive and tacit gesture that accepts the history of 
style-formations in Western European canonical literature as the evaluation of style as such. I 
am not recommending varieties of reactive nostalgia such as an unexamined adulation of 
working class culture, an ostentatious rejection of elitist standards, a devotion to all non- 
161 am grateful to Todd Snyder for suggesting this line of thought to me. 
17A representative essay would be Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," Hal 
Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic. As is demonstrated in the revised version of this essay, to be found in New 
Left Review as "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," Jameson is ambivalent about 
these possibilities. 
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Judaeo-Christian mythologies, or the timid evocation of"poetry being written in Nicaragua." 
In fact, the version of historical narrative I am sketching here can be expanded to show that, 
in such nostalgic evaluative norms as the list above, the history of the epistemic violence of 
imperialism as crisis-management can still operate. Regular periodization should rather be 
seen in its role within the historical normalization required by the world-system of political 
economy, engaged in the production and realization of Value, the "post-modern" its latest 
symptom. Such evaluations would accommodate the "materialist" articulation of Value 
within what I described earlier as the practical position of Value in our discipline in the nar- 
row sense, underlining the role of exploitation in understanding domination.18 
In "Marx's (not Ricardo's) 'Transformation Problem,'" Richard A. Wolff, Bruce Brothers, 
and Antonino Collari suggest that when "Marx . . . considers a social object in which the 
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the relevant magnitude must be the price of production of the consumed means of produc- 
tion and not the abstract labor time physically embodied in them" [Wolff et al., "Marx's 
'Transformation Problem,'" 574]. I have so far been arguing, among other things, that to set 
the labor theory of value aside is to forget the textual and axiological implications of a 
materialist predication of the subject. The passage I quote, however, seems to be an appro- 
priate description of the perspectival move which provisionally must set that theory aside. As 
a result of this move, "the equivalence of exchange must be constructed out of the processes 
specific to competitive capitalism which tend to establish a proportional distribution of un- 
paid labor time in the form of an average rate of profit on total capital, no longer assumed as 
in volume 1" ["Marx's'Transformation Problem'" 572; italics mine, and I have conflated three 
18The Marx that is useful here is not the philosopher of history, but rather the theoretician of crisis. It is 
in the sketched theory of crisis that Marx most anticipates the international division of labor, least impos- 
ing the normative narrative of modes of production in the world outside Western Europe. Concise ac- 
counts of crisis theory, and crisis theory and contemporary imperialism, are to be found in Robert I. 
Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970). A 
systematic development of Marx's theory of production, distribution, and circulation into the regulation 
of crises is to be found in Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. Peter F. Bell and Harry 
Cleaver give an account of the development of Marx's own theory of crisis in "Marx's Theory as a Theory 
of Class Struggle," Research in Political Economy 5(1982). 
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sentences]. Thus the authors situate the specific arena of the labor theory of value but go on 
to suggest that, since "Marx's focus [was] on class relations as his object of 
discourse . . simultaneously, however, the concept of value remains crucial to the quantifi- 
cation of prices of production. Price on production, as an absolute magnitude of labor time, 
can be conceived only as a specific deviation from value" ["Marx's 'Transformation Problem'" 
575; italics mine]. 
I have not touched the topic of the value-price relationship in these pages. Further, I 
have questioned the mechanics of limiting the definition of value to the physical embodi- 
ment of abstract labor time. I would in fact argue that the premises of Capital I are 
themselves dependent upon a gesture of reduction that may be called a construction 
[Capital 1 135]. Generalizing from Wolff's and his co-authors' position, I would find that 
Marx's focus on class (mode of production) must be made to accommodate his reach on 
crisis (world system). Yet Wolff and his co-authors' perspectival situation of the labor theory 
of value and concurrent definition of price of production as deviation or differential seem to 
us admirably just. Within the discipline of economics, which must keep any textualized no- 
tion of use-value out, it seems crucial to suggest that "Marx ... affirms the interdependence 
of value and value form ([understood as] price of production), an interdependence which 
cannot be expressed by treating the relation between the two concepts as merely a func- 
tional relation between dependent and independent variables."19 As I move more con- 
clusively into the enclosure of my own disciplinary discourse, perhaps it might not be inap- 
propriate to suggest that this essay does no more than point at the confused ideological 
space of some varieties of such an interdependence. 
I will now appropriate yet another item on the threshold of this essay: the Derridian 
concept of "interest" as in "scrupulous declaration of interest." Derrida's own understanding 
of surplus-value as capital-appreciation or interest is, as I have suggested above, restricted. I 
simply wrest it back from that "false" metaphor and "literalize" it.20 If and when we ask and 
answer the question of value, there seems to be no alternative to declaring one's "interest" in 
the text of the production of Value. 
I offer this formula because the problem of "how to relate a critique of'foundationalism,' 
which like its object is interminable and may always go astray, to a critique of ideology that 
allows for at least provisional endings and ends in research and 'political' practice" remains 
with us [Dominick La Capra, Lecture given at Wesleyan University, 1984]. The early Derrida 
assured us that "deconstruction falls a prey to its own critique" and went largely unheeded 
[Of Grammatology 24]. The later Derrida, miming this precaution interminably, has been 
written off as, at best, a formal experimentalist or, at worst, uninteresting and repetitive. It 
should be clear from the last few pages that I can endorse Jean-Frangois Lyotard's benevolent 
19"Marx's Transformation Problem," p. 576. This, incidentally, also reveals the mistake of the layperson 
who "refutes" the labor theory of value because "you cannot deduce prices from it." Marx's theory is one 
where politics, economics, and ideology are relatively autonomous in the determination of class relations 
in the broadest sense. The point, therefore, is not to reduce value to a calculus of price, especially within 
models of general equilibrium. Wolff, et al. do produce equations that take this into account. They are, 
however, aware that the more important issue is that the practical moment in Marx questions abstract 
economic rigor; even as I argue in the body of this essay that the axiological moment in Marx questions 
mere philosophical justice. 
20The most powerful development of this conception is the mysterious Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. 
Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Part of the mystery lies, I think, in that Der- 
rida is here trying to make "woman his subject" (his "interest"?) and hint enigmatically at "affirmative 
deconstruction." As I will soon explain, my notion of interest must take the risk of being related to the 
deliberative consciousness. Over a year after the writing of this essay, at the point of implementing the 
final editorial suggestions, I begin to realize how astutely Paul de Man had predicted this move from 
"false" metaphor to "literalization " in the field of political practice. It would take a careful elaboration of 
de Man's entire complex argument in Allegories of Reading to establish the parallel between my move 
here and grammar and "figure" in the following definition of textuality: "We call text any entity that can 
be considered from . . . a double perspective: as a generative, open-ended, non-referential grammatic 
system and as a figural system closed off by a transcendental system that subverts the grammatical code to 
which the text owes its existence" [Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading 270; italics mine]. Suffice it here to 
consolidate the parallel by pointing out that, towards the bottom of the same page, de Man aphoristically 
describes the necessity of this subversion, this closing off, in the following way: ". .. and if a text does not 
act, it cannot state what it knows" (italics mine). 
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"paganism" as an axiological model as little as I can JOrgen Habermas's Europocentric ra- 
tionalism. [ean-Franlois Lyotard, Instructions parennes; Rudiments paiens with Jean-Loup 
Th6baud, Au juste. JOrgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society.] One of 
the more interesting solutions offered is Dominick La Capra's "historiography as 
transference." Yet there, too, there are certain desires to appropriate the workings of the un- 
conscious of which we should beware. For "repetition-displacement of the past into the pres- 
ent" (La Capra's version of transferential historiography) may be too continuist and harmless 
a version of the transactions in transference. And it might not be enough simply to say that "it 
is a useful critical fiction to believe that the texts or phenomena to be interpreted may 
answer back and even be convincing enough to lead one to change one's mind" [La Capra, 
History and Criticism 73]. Given Lacan's elaborate unfolding of the relationship between 
transference and the ethical moment, I can do no better here than to reiterate an earlier 
doubt, expressed not in terms of historiography but rather of literary criticism: 
Nor will the difference between text and person be conveniently effaced by refusing 
to talk about the psyche, by talking about the text as part of a self-propagating 
mechanism. The disjunctive, discontinuous metaphor of the subject, carrying and 
being carried by its burden of desire, does systematically misguide and constitute the 
machine of text, carrying and being carried by its burden of "figuration." One cannot 
escape it by dismissing the former as the residue of a productive cut, and valorizing 
the latter as the only possible concern of a "philosophical" literary criticism. This op- 
position too, between subject "metaphor" and text "metaphor," needs to be in- 
definitely deconstructed rather than hierarchized. [Spivak, "The Letter as Cutting 
Edge," Literature and Psychoanalysis: Reading Otherwise 225] 
The formula 
-"scrupulous declaration of interest in the text of the production of 
Value"- that I offer comes out of the most problematic effect of the sovereign subject, the 
so-called deliberative consciousness. Thus, there is no guarantee in deconstruction for freez- 
ing this imperative into a coercive theoretical universal, though it is of course subject to all 
the constraints of ethico-logical grounding. The encroachment of the fictive (related, of 
course, to the textual) upon this operation cannot be appreciated without passing through 
the seemingly deliberative, which, even in the most self-conscious transferential situation, 
can, at any rate, only be resisted rather than fully avoided. 
In closing, I will invoke the very threshold, the second paragraph of this essay, where I 
write: "The 'idealist' and the 'materialist' are both exclusive predications." All predications are 
exclusive and thus operate on the metonymic principle of a part standing for the putative 
whole: "As soon as one retains only a predicate of the circle (for example, return to the point 
of departure, closing off the circuit), its signification is put into the position of a trope, of 
metonymy if not metaphor" [Derrida, "White Mythology" 264]. In this sense, the "idealist" 
and the "materialist" predications of the subject are metonyms of the subject. Writing of the 
constitution of the subject as such, Lacan writes: "The double-triggered mechanism of 
metaphor is the very mechanism by which the symptom . . is determined. And the 
enigmas that desire seems to pose for a 'natural philosophy' . . . amount to no other de- 
rangement of instinct than that of ... metonymy" ["The Agency of the Letter in the Uncon- 
scious" Ecrits 166-67]. In so far as the two predications are concepts of the subject, they are 
unacknowledged metaphoric substitute-presentations of the subject. Between metaphor 
and metonymy, symptom and desire, the political subject distances itself from the analyst-in- 
transference by declaring an "interest" by way of a "wild" rather than theoretically grounded 
practice. Lest I seem, once again, to be operating on an uncomfortable level of abstraction, 
let me choose a most non-esoteric source. Here is the McCraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern 
Economics on the encroachment of the fictive upon the deliberative in the operation of the 
economic text: 
Originally the Dow-Jones averages represented the average (arithmetical mean) 
price of a share of stock in the group. As stocks split, the substitution of issues in the 
averages, and other factors occurred, however, a formula was devised to compen- 
sate for these changes. Although the Dow-Jones averages no longer represent the 
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actual average prices of these stocks in the groups, they still represent the levels and 
changes in the stock-prices reasonably well. [178] 
I say above that "the full implications of the question of Value posed within the 
'materialist' predication of the subject cannot yet be realized." I must now admit what many 
Marxist theoreticians admit today: that in any theoretical formulation, the horizon of full 
realization must be indefinitely and irreducibly postponed. On that horizon it is not utopia 
that may be glimpsed [see Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative As A Socially Sym- 
bolic Act 103f]. For utopias are historical attempts at topographic descriptions that must 
become dissimulative if attempts are made to represent them adequately in actual social 
practice. The complicity between idealisms and materialisms in the production of theory is 
better acknowledged, even as one distances oneself from idealism, if one designates this 
open end by the name of the "apocalyptic tone."21 This tone announces the pluralized 
apocalypse of the practical moment, in our particular case the set or ensemble of ideology- 
critical, aesthetic-troping, economically-aware performative or operational value-judgment. 
My careful language here should make clear that the practical moment is not a "fulfillment." 
In the pluralized apocalypse, the body does not rise. There is no particular need to see this as 
the thematics of castration. Why not affirm as its concept-metaphor the performative and 
operational evaluation of the repeated moves of the body's survival and comfort, historically 
named woman's work or assigned to domestic labor when it is minimally organized? Why 
appropriate the irreducible non-fit between theory and practice (here in the grounding and 
making of Value judgments) into Oedipus's hobble? 
I offer, then, no particular apology for this deliberate attempt to show the difference be- 
tween pre-critical economism and the role of the economic text in the determination of 
Value; and, further, to plot some of the "interests" in its foreclosure. 
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